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STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 2 
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 (1953) 4,33 
IV 
I. JURISDICTION 
1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2a-3(h)(1953). 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial judge erred in holding that the alimony and rent 
provisions of the Decree and Amended Decree and Findings of Fact were not 
ambiguous, and in awarding judgment to Mr. Lether for over $17,000.00 in rent 
that Mrs Lether had collected as part of her alimony for over 18 months without his 
objection. 
2. Whether the trial judge erred in granting Mr. Lether summary judgment 
dismissing Mrs Lether's petition for additional alimony on the basis that there were 
no genuine issues as to any material fact regarding a substantial change of 
circumstances since the Decree of Divorce. 
3. Whether the trial judge erred in dismissing Mrs Lether's petition to 
reconsider property distribution provisions of the Decree and of the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, based on the alleged fraud of Mr. Lether in grossly 
over representing the value of those assets which were awarded to Mrs Lether and 
under- representing the value of the assets which were awarded to him. 
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A. Citations to Record Showing Issues Preserved For Appeal. 
(Citations on appeal shall be to the Appeal Record abbreviated AR and page 
number. Transcripts wil l be cited with their page number of the appeal 
record (AR) and the page number of the relevant pages of the transcript.) 
1. AR 433-436, <fl 4, AR 429; 551-555, 564-566; 616-618, 622. 
2. AR 429-432; 843-857; 1171-1173; 1270-1276; 1309, pp 15-22. 
3. AR 429-431, 428; 558-562; 615-616; 1275. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCE AND RULES AND REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE 
OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures: 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all 
or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought shall 
be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered 
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on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of 
damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial 
is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and 
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain 
what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are 
actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order 
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent 
to which the amount of damages or other relief is not to controversy, and directing 
such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted 
accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts 
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all 
papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served 
therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for 
summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, 
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit 
facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is 
just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
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presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith 
order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of the 
reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including 
reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged 
guilty of contempt. 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children - Division of debts - Court to have continuing 
jurisdiction - Custody and visitation - Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious 
petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court 
shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obliges, 
regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the 
parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 
11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred 
on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of 
the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate 
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and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an 
order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent 
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new 
orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members or the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the 
child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation schedule a 
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court 
ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court 
order is made and denied, the court shall order the Petitioner to pay the reasonable 
attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court 
determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or defended against 
in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by a 
parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to Section 
78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the 
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and 
court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to 
provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing 
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at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Section (a). 
However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and 
may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time 
of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived or 
born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed 
at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that 
change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the 
amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhance 
through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and 
no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may 
consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the 
divorce. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes 
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree 
was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that 
action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of 
the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if 
the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of 
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years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, 
the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a 
longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the 
court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the 
remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found 
to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is 
made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates 
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is 
cohabiting with another person. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
1. On July 6, 1994 Elizabeth Lether obtained a divorce from Richard Lether 
after over 29 years of marriage. The Decree awarded Mrs Lether two pieces of real 
property in Utah County consisting often acres with a home in which the parties 
lived, known as the farm property, and 20 acres adjacent to the farm property with 
a home that was rented, known as the Birrell property. Mr. Lether was ordered to 
pay the mortgages on those two pieces of property until July 1, 1996, or until 
enough property was sold to pay off the mortgages at an earlier date. He was 
ordered to pay Mrs Lether $1,000.00 per month alimony until the Birrell property 
was sold. The home was being rented for which Mr. Lether was receiving $950.00 
per month at the time of the divorce. After the divorce Mrs Lether began collecting 
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the rent. When the Birrell property was sold the Decree provided that Mr. Lether 
was to increase his alimony payments to Mrs Lether by $950.00, or in other words, 
to increase the alimony payment by the amount of the rent. 
2. Mrs Lether sold 19.2 acres of the Birrell property minus the home, at the 
end of November 1996. She sold the property on a contract and was able to pay 
off the mortgage on the Birrell property together with her outstanding obligations 
which she had incurred since the decree. However, she was unable to pay off the 
mortgage on the farm property. She sold the home with .60 acre of land on the 
Birrell property at the end of January 1997. 
3. A dispute arose over whether the increase in alimony should have begun 
in January or in February 1997. Mrs Lether filed a motion for an order to show 
cause why he shouldn't be required to pay her the additional alimony of $950.00 
per month for the month of January, along with other things. Mr. Lether countered 
by filing a motion for judgment, claiming for the first time that he was entitled to 
receive rent from the Birrell property, which Mrs Lether had been collecting for 
over 18 months since the divorce. After the filing of a petition for clarification and 
a reformation or modification of the Decree of Divorce and the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and after the briefing and oral argument by the parties, the trial 
judge ruled that the Decree and Findings and Conclusions were not ambiguous, 
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and awarded judgment against Mrs Lether in favor of Mr. Lether for the $950.00 per 
month rent together with interest, amounting to over $20,000.00. In the same 
ruling, the trial judge dismissed the portion of the petition in which Mrs Lether 
brought to open the property settlement and distribution in the divorce on the basis 
of fraud by Mr. Lether in knowingly over stating the value of the property at the 
time the parties entered into their stipulation and property settlement agreement, 
and which was subsequently included in the Divorce Decree 
4. After limited discovery and further briefing and oral argument of the 
parties, the court granted the motion for summary judgment of Mr. Lether and 
dismissed Mrs Lether's petition for further alimony. It did so on the basis that there 
were no genuine issues of material fact concerning any substantial change of 
circumstances since the Decree of Divorce relating to the health and employment 
of Mrs Lether. This appeal followed. 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
1. Elizabeth and Richard Tebbs Lether were married on March 7, 1965. (AR 
215) They lived together as husband and wife for over 29 years until they were 
divorced on July 5, 1994. (AR 243) 
2. The Decree awarded Elizabeth Lether two parcels of real property in the 
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City of Highland, Utah County, Utah. One parcel was known as the "farm 
property", which consisted of a home in which the parties lived, and ten acres of 
property. The other parcel, known as the "Birell property", consisted of 20 acres 
and a small farm home. (AR 242-243) The real property was valued at 
$932,906.00 (AR 241), and together with the personal property awarded to the 
Petitioner, was valued at $1,098,768.00. (AR 238, 242, 289, 294) 
3. Richard Lether was awarded a condominium in American Towers in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, together with two pieces of commercial, business property in Salt 
Lake City; along with a business which had been developed during the marriage. 
The business consisted of selling used and refurbished lathes and other small 
equipment. The property awarded to Mr. Lether was valued at $645,174.00 (AR 
235, 238, 285, 289). No value was placed upon the business. 
4. Mrs Lether was awarded alimony until July 1, 1996, amounting to 
$1,000.00 per month, until the Birrell property was sold, at which time the alimony 
was to be increased by $950.00 to a total of $1,950.00. (AR 276, <H 10; 253, <H 
6; 282, H 6) 
5. Mr. Lether was to continue to pay mortgage payments on the two parcels 
of property until enough property was sold to payoff the mortgages on those pieces, 
or until July 1, 1996. The Decree and Findings and Conclusions stated that the 
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mortgage payment on the farm property amounted to $1,600.00 per month, and the 
mortgage payment on the Birrell property amounted to $1,630.00. (AR 284) 
a. Facts Relating To Ambiguity. 
6. Paragraph 6 of the Conclusions of Law and Amended Conclusions of Law 
and paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce and Amended Decree of Divorce are 
nearly identical and have conflicting terms relating to alimony. (AR 90-230-253-
282) The first term or clause of the last sentence of each of these paragraphs reads 
Plaintiff where it should read Defendant, and Defendant where it should read 
Plaintiff. In other words, the parties are switched. It states the "Plaintiff's alimony 
obligation to the Defendant shall cease on July 1, I996 and Plaintiff hereby waives 
alimony after July 1, I996 and forever/' Plaintiff had no alimony obligation to 
defendant as is inferred by the first clause of that sentence. 
7. There is ambiguity in the provisions relating to a payment of alimony 
between the Stipulation and the property settlement agreement in the Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce and the use of the provision in the Findings of Fact. 
Those provisions variously use "Birrell rental property", "Birrell rental home ", and 
Birrell property. Findings of Fact Tl 10 states that the alimony of "$1,000.00 a 
month is to be increased to $1,950.00 per month upon the sale of the Birrell 
property" (emphasis added). (AR 213 and 276) §6 of the Stipulation and property 
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agreement titled Alimony and paragraph 6 of the Conclusions of Law and Amended 
Conclusions of Law provide that "The Defendant shall receive $950.00 per month 
from the Birrell rental home until it is sold. When the Birrell rental home has been 
sold Defendant should pay an additional $950.00 per month to Plaintiff for 
alimony". (Emphasis added). (AR 171,190, and 253). Decree of Divorce and 
amended Decree of Divorce in paragraph 6 provides that "Defendant shall receive 
$950.00 per month from the Birrell rental home until it is sold. When the Birrell 
rental property has been sold Defendant shall pay an additional $950.00 per 
month to Plaintive for alimony ". (emphasis added). (AR 230 and 282) The 
ambiguity rises over whether the provisions mean the alimony shall be increased 
when only the rental home is sold or when the Birrell property is sold. 
8. The second sentence in each of those paragraphs (^ 6 of the Conclusions 
of Law & % 6 of the Decree of Divorce) reads,: The Defendant should receive 
$950.00 per month from the Birrell rental home until it is sold, when it should read 
the Plaintiff should receive $950.00 per month from the Birrell rental home until it 
is sold. In other words, the Plaintiff claims that the description of the party is 
switched in that sentence (id.) 
9. The above referenced paragraphs in the Conclusions of Law and Decree of 
Divorce containing provisions relating to the alimony to be paid to Plaintiff by the 
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Defendant appear to provide that the Defendant wil l pay alimony to the Plaintiff 
until July 1, 1996 at which time alimony wil l cease. 
10. However, paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact and the Amended 
Findings of Fact conflicts with the provisions in paragraph 6 of the Conclusions of 
Law and the Decree of Divorce in that it appears to state that the Plaintiff would be 
able to provide her own financial needs from the sale of the marital assets after July 
1, 1996 together with the award of alimony which amounts to $1,000.00 a month 
until the Birrell Property is sold and then to be increased to $1,950.00 a month. (AR 
213, 276) (emphasis added) 
11. (AR 319-320) Mrs Lether sold the Birrell property minus the home and 
part of an acre in December of 1996. She sold the home with the part of an acre 
on January 31 , 1997. (AR 190, 213, 253, 276) 
12. Paragraph 6 of the Decree of Divorce and Amended Decree of Divorce 
are almost identical to paragraph 6 of the Conclusions of Law and amended 
Conclusions of Law. Use of the two different descriptive terms with regard to the 
sale of the Birrell property creates an ambiguity as to whether alimony shall 
increase to $1,950.00 per month when the Birrell property is sold or when the 
Birrell rental home is sold. (CR 230-232) 
13. Defendant did not increase his alimony payment to $1,950.00 until 
13 
February 1996. The Plaintiff claiming that it should have increase in January 
brought a motion for order to show cause as to why Defendant should not pay the 
increase in alimony for the months of January and February 1996. (CR 316-321 and 
exhibits) 
13(a). When Mrs Lether moved for an order to show cause why she should 
not be paid the additional alimony, Mr. Lether filed a motion to have judgment 
entered against her in the amount of $17,100.00 plus interest for the monthly rent 
on the Birrell property from the date the Decree was entered on July 6, 1994 until 
the property was sold on January 31 , 1996. (AR 325-326) 
14. This was the first time in nearly two years that Mr. Lether asserted he was 
entitled to the rent from the Birrell property. (AR 1307, pp.16-17) 
15. Mrs Lether argued in defense of the motion for judgment that she was to 
receive $1950.00 alimony per month. She was to receive the rent of $950.00 and 
Mr. Lether was to pay $1,000.00 until the Birrell property was sold. Thereafter he 
was to increase his payments to $1,950.00 per month. (AR 1307, pp.5-6, 8; AR 
552) 
16. Mrs Lether asked the Court to allow her to put on parole evidence that 
strongly supported her argument that she was entitled to the rent from the Birrell 
property. That proffer showed the parole evidence would be as follows: 
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1) The affidavit from her trial attorney Jimi Mitsunaga together with 
its exhibit of notes that he made during the settlement negotiations indicated 
that she was receiving $2,000.00 in alimony prior to the divorce, and that 
after the divorce she was to receive $1,000.00 per month directly from the 
Defendant and $950.00 per month from the rental property as alimony until 
it was sold . ( Mitsunaga off.1, AR 417, 425) 
2) Documentation which Mrs Lether received from the Internal 
Revenue Service led her to conclude that Mr. Lether either claimed for the 
taxable year 1994 that she received the $950.00 per month rent, or that he 
was to be credited as alimony for the amount of the rent, and was not to 
include it as his taxable income. (AR 591) 
3) Mrs Lether testified at trial that she was receiving $2,000.00 per 
month or $1,000.00 every two weeks in alimony right up to the date of the 
divorce. 
4) Mr. Lether testified at trial that he was paying Mrs Lether $2,000.00 
per month alimony prior to the time of the trial. (AR 301, pp.103-104) 
17. The trial judge ruled that the Decree of Divorce and Amended Decree of 
Divorce were not ambiguous on their face and entered judgment against Mrs Lether 
in the amount of $20,158.20, including $3,058.20 accrued interest to the date of 
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judgment. (AR 617-618, 622) The court concluded that it could not consider parole 
evidence. It determined that the Decree incorporated terms used in the property 
settlement agreement which was a final and complete expression of their bargain, 
and that the provisions in the Decree were not ambiguous on their face. (AR 617) 
b. Facts Relating To Issues of Alimony 
18. Mr. Lether paid Mrs Lether alimony of $1,950.00 per month from 
February 1996 until July 1, 1996 at which time he terminated the alimony. (AR 
415-416,282) 
19. On August 5, 1996 Mrs Lether filed a Petition to Modify and for 
Clarification and or Reformation of Decree in which she alleged, among other 
things, in paragraph 6 a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce and prayed that the Court award her a further award of alimony 
that was determined to be appropriate. (AR 430-433, 429) 
20. The trial judge in ruling on Mr. Lether's Motion to Dismiss ruled that Mrs 
Lether could not re-litigate the health issues raised at the time of the divorce, but 
could raise issues that were not litigated at the time of the divorce such as new 
injuries and a decline or worsening in her health since the entry of the Decree. (AR 
613-614,622) 
21 . Mrs Lether averred by affidavit that her knee joints had deteriorated 
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since the divorce in July 1994. She found: (1 )that she required a total right knee 
replacement! performed in May 1995): (2) that the condition of her feet had 
worsened significantly since the Decree; (3) that the bones in her left wrist and 
hand had deteriorated so much (1996) that she could not pick up dishes to wash 
them and had to have it operated on; (4) that she was developing a similar 
condition in her right wrist; (5) that her feet had deteriorated significantly and had 
become infected and were not healing properly. (AR 891-892) 
22. Mrs Lether averred that her medical expenses had increased significantly, 
and that since the beginning of the year 1994 she had expended over $42,000.00 
on medical and dental expenses. (AR 891) 
23. Mrs Lether also averred that she had not anticipated the huge expenses 
that would be incurred keeping the property maintained until she could sell it. She 
had to replace a John Deer tractor at the cost of $11,000.00 for which she had to 
obtain a loan to purchase. (AR 889-890) 
24. Mrs Lether attached to her affidavit clinical notes from records of Michael 
E. Callahan, M.D. of the American Fork Hospital and North Valley Surgical 
Associates in American Fork, Utah. The notes recorded Dr. Callahan's 
examinations of Mrs Lether over the past two or three years and the deterioration in 
the condition of her knees and her feet. (AR 877-884) Dr. Callahan's 
17 
memorandum or notes relating to his surgery on Mrs Lether's right knee in May of 
1995, one year after the divorce, were attached to Mr Lether's affidavit as part of 
Exhibit B. This memorandum shows the continued deterioration and acute 
problems with her knee which had to be encountered in the operation. (AR 877-
879) 
25. In opposition to Mr. Lether's motion for summary judgment, Mrs Lether 
also filed an affidavit from Thomas G. Rogers D.P.M. one of her many medical 
practitioners, which averred that he treated her for her foot problems and that her 
right foot had deteriorated considerably in the last two years, that her left foot was 
now developing similar problems, and found that she would need corrective 
surgery on her left foot as well as additional corrective surgery on her right. He also 
found that she could not work at a job which required her to be on her feet or use 
her feet. (AR 860-861) 
26. Mrs Lether attached to her affidavit as Exhibit B a computer printout of 
her medical expenses, including stress therapy, and the cost of her medication 
showing that she had significant medical costs since the Decree of Divorce. (AR 
864,871) 
27. The Court's Findings of Fact and Amended Findings of Fact entered in 
connection with the Decree of Divorce number 5 stated that the Plaintiff, though 
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unemployed, was employable and capable of earning minimum wage. (AR 215, 
278) 
28. In ruling on Mr. Lether's motion for summary judgment, the trial judge 
ignored the evidence submitted by Mrs Lether and concluded on the basis of some 
of the testimony at the trial that since she hadn't worked in the three years since the 
Decree, that she was not employed at the time of the trial and that there was no 
genuine issue of material facts concerning whether it was foreseeable that she may 
be unemployable after the divorce. The trial judge entered summary judgment 
dismissing Mrs Lether's petition for modification of the alimony provisions of the 
Decree. (AR 1171-1173; 1271 -1272, 1275, 1376) 
c. Facts Relevant To Allegations Of Fraud In Property Settlement. 
29. Plaintiff's petition for modification of the Divorce Decree also alleged 
that Mr. Lether fraudulently overstated the value of the assets of the estate which 
were awarded to the Plaintiff, and under-stated the value of the assets that were 
awarded to him. (Petition H <H 9-10, AR 430-431) 
30. The piano awarded to the Plaintiff was valued at $10,000.00, and the 
furniture in the home at $40,000.00 in the divorce. (AR 180, 271) Mrs Lether's 
jewelry was valued at $10,250.00. (AR 179, 270) 
31 . Mrs Lether learned after the divorce that Mr. Lether paid only $4,500.00 
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for the piano when it was new, 20 years earlier, and that he paid only $2,500.00 for 
her jewelry. (AR 588) 
32. Mr. Lether also misrepresented by about double the amount of the 
payments that had to be made on the mortgages of the Birrell and farm properties at 
a time when his attorney was negotiating with the attorney for Mrs Lether as to how 
much interim support he could pay to Mrs Lether. This misrepresentation 
continued right up to the signing of the Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement, and the issuing of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the 
Decree. (AR 174, 192, 232, 255, 284) 
33. In reality, the payments were only about $800.00 for each piece of 
property which is what Mr. Lether paid after the Decree of Divorce notwithstanding 
he had been ordered to pay $1,600.00 toward the mortgage on the farm property 
and $1,630.00 toward the mortgage on the Birrell property each month, (id.) 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Provisions of the Decree and Conclusions of Law Relating to the Payment of 
Alimony are Ambiguous. 
The provisions in the Decree, the Conclusions of Law and the Findings of 
Fact relating to alimony and the entitlement to the rent from the Birrell rental 
property are ambiguous. Mrs Lether was to receive $1,950.00 a month alimony 
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from the date of the divorce. She was to receive and did receive the rent of $950 
from the Birrell property as part of the alimony. Mr. Lether was to pay her 
$1,000.00 a month until the Birrell rental property or Birrell rental home was sold. 
He was then to increase his payments to $1,950.00 a month. 
Mr. Lether sudden claim that he was entitled to the rent although he had not 
asserted the claim for over eighteen months after the divorce is not credible when 
all of the circumstances are considered. The court erred in construing the Decree 
as being unambiguous and in entering judgment absent the extrinsic evidence 
notwithstanding. Mrs Lether contends it was understood by all of the parties at the 
time of the divorce that she wass entitled to the rent as part of the alimony. 
Because of the switching of the terms plaintiff and defendant in the last 
sentence of Tl 6, Mrs Lether argues the descriptions of the parties were also 
switched in the provision or sentence of that paragraph which provides for the 
collection of the rent. That construction is only logical when the Decree, the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Property Settlement Agreement are 
construed together as a whole. It is the only construction that makes any sense 
under the circumstances. 
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B. There Has Been a Substantial Change of Circumstances Since the Entry of the 
Decree Warranting an Award of Alimony to the Plaintive. 
Mrs Lether filed a petition for clarification and a reformation and 
modification of the Decree which included a claim that her alimony should be re-
instated due to substantial change of circumstances. The circumstances upon 
which she relies are a significant deterioration in her health since the divorce, her 
inability to take employment and her increased expenses since the Decree. Her 
physical ailments include new injuries and old injuries which have greatly 
increased her living expenses and prevented her from being employed. The 
property awarded to her did not sell nearly as quickly as contemplated by either 
party at the time of entered into the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. 
The expenses required to maintain the property and keep it in condition for 
resale over the longer period of time placed a significant burden upon the Plaintiff 
which she was unable to meet without encumbering and dissipating much of her 
financial interest in the real-estate awarded to her. The evidence submitted in Mrs 
Lether's affidavit and that submitted by her medical doctor was sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact that could not be resolved without a hearing. 
The court erred in awarding judgment to the Defendant for the rent it and in 
dismissing part of the petition, at the same time. The trial court did not view the 
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evidence and all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to Mrs Lether. Had the trial court viewed the evidence which Mrs 
Lether proffered by affidavit and from the court records regarding these issues in a 
light more favorable to her he could not have granted the Defendant Summary 
Judgment dismissing her claims for reinstatement or continuation of her award of 
alimony. The decision of the trial judge should be overturned and the case 
remanded for trial. 
C. Mr. Lether Fraudulently Represented the Value of Some of the Assets in the 
Settlement Negotiations Which Were Incorporated Into the Decree. 
Mrs Lethr urged the court to re-open the property settlement because Mr. 
Lether had knowingly misrepresented the value of the assets in the marriage 
including the overstatement of the value of the assets which were awarded to Mrs 
Lether and the under-statement of assets which were awarded to him. Mr. Lether 
grossly overstated the value of the personal property awarded to Mrs Lether 
including a piano which he said was worth $10,500.00 and her jewelry which he 
said was worth $10,250.00. Mrs Lether found documentation after the divorce was 
final which indicated that Mr. Lether had paid only $4,500.00 twenty years earlier 
for the piano when it was new and that he had only paid $2,500.00 for her jewelry 
that he valued at $10,250.00. 
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Mr. Lether also misrepresented the amount of the payments on the 
mortgages for the farm property and the Birrell property as being nearly twice as 
great as they in fact were. While these two latter misrepresentations do not go to 
the value of the property awarded to Mrs Lether in the Decree, they do indicate that 
Mr. Lether was knowingly deceptive and place in question his veracity on all other 
things in the divorce. 
The court erred in holding that the Mrs Lether should be bound by her 
agreeing to the values stated in the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. 
The Property Settlement Agreement like any other contract cannot be properly and 
knowingly entered into if there is fraud on the part of Mr. Lether. Mrs Lether did 
not have information for her consideration in entering into the agreement that Mr. 
Lether had and Mr. Lether knew she did not. There could not have been a meeting 
of the minds. Misrepresentation of the terms of the agreement by one of the parties 
to a contract gives the other party the option of rescinding the agreement. Mr. 
Lether should not be shielded from his intentional deceit and kowing misrep-
resentation of the values of the properties by some waiver that Mrs Lether 
unwittingly agreed to because she did not have all of the facts. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. The alimony provisions of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
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Decree are ambiguous. 
The courts interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of 
contract interpretation. [Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d, 923, 928 (Utah App. 1998)] 
On determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must be 
considered, [id., Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d, 264 (Utah 
App. 1955)] 
"While there is Utah case law that espouses a stricter application 
of the rule (parole evidence) and would restrict a determination of 
whether ambiguity exists to a judges determination of the meaning of the 
terms of the writing itself, the better reasoned approach is to consider the 
writing in light of the surrounding circumstances/' [Ward v. Intermountain 
Farmers Association, 907 P.2d, 264, 268 citing restatement (Second) of 
contracts § 212 and cmt. b (1979): Corbin § 579; Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 69 
Cal.Rprtr. at 563, 444 P.2d at 644; Garden State Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kressge 
Co., 78 N.J.Super. 485, 189 A.2d 448, 454-55(1963): C.R. Anthony Co. v. 
Loretto Mall Partners, 112 N.M. 504, 508-09, 817 P.2d 238, 242-43 (1991).] 
Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n continues at 907 P.2d 268 by quoting: 
"[R]ational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of 
all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties . . . so 
that the court can 'place itself in the same situation in which the parties 
found themselves at the time of contracting.'" Citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 
69 Cal.Rprtr. At 565, 442 P.2d at 645 (Quoting Universal Sales Corp. v. 
California Press Mfg. Co., 20 Cal. 2d 751, 128 P.2d 665, 672 (1942): See 
also Corbin § 579.) 
After considering such information the court should determine whether the 
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contract or its terms are ambiguous or unambiguous. If they are ambiguous, it 
should consider extrinsic evidence to clarify the ambiguous terms. If it determines 
it is not ambiguous, then the parties intentions must be determined solely from the 
language of the contract. (Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n at 268, and other 
cases cited by Ward) 
Contract, in this case the Decree, language may be ambiguous if the words 
used to express the meaning and intention of the parties are insufficient in the sense 
that the contract may be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings. 
[Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 1989)] A contract 
is ambiguous if the words (or terms) used may be understood to support two or 
more plausible meanings. [Taylor v. Hansen, Faulkner v. Farnsworth, Supra, 665 
P.2d 1292 (Utah App. 1983)] A contract may be ambiguous because of the 
uncertain meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies, (id.) 
When a document is ambiguous, parole evidence should be used to determine its 
meaning and to establish the parties intentions. (Taylor v. Hansen, Ward v. 
Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, Faulkner v. Farnsworth, Supra.) In this case 
paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and of the Decree, both 
initial and amended, have at least a facial deficiency which allow the terms to be 
read to have two plausible meanings. The last sentence of that paragraph states that 
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"Plaintiff's alimony obligation to Defendant shall cease on July 1, 1996 and the 
Plaintiff hereby waives alimony after July 1, 1996 and forever.'' The Plaintiff has no 
alimony obligation to the Defendant. The situation is the opposite; the Defendant 
has an alimony obligation to the Plaintiff. It is obvious that the Plaintiff and 
Defendant in the first half of that sentence are switched and it should read "the 
Defendant's alimony obligation to the Plaintiff shall cease on July 1, 1996 . . . " 
The second sentence reads "The Defendant shall receive $950.00 per month 
from the Birrell rental home until it is sold." The next sentence reads "When the 
Birrell rental property has been sold, Defendant shall pay an additional $950.00 per 
month to the Plaintiff for alimony." In view of the switching of the description of 
the parties in the last sentence It is plausible to reason that the descriptions of the 
parties were switched previously in that same provision, because when the Birrell 
rental property or home is sold, the Defendant has to pay the Plaintiff an additional 
$950.00 per month. Mrs Lether's alimony is suddenly increased by $950.00 for 
apparently no good reason. 
Further, If the Defendant were to be receiving $950.00 per month from the 
Birrell rental home until it was sold and then have to pay an additional $950.00 per 
month to the Plaintiff after it was sold, the Defendant's obligation would suddenly 
be increased by $1,900.00, not just $950.00. He would be paying that much more 
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out-of-pocket to the Plaintiff for alimony after the rental home was sold than he was 
paying prior to it's sale. (The same provision in the Stipulation and Property 
Settlement agreement, Section 6 captioned alimony suffers from the same use of the 
words Plaintiff and Defendant AR 171 -172.) 
To further add to the ambiguity, paragraph 10 of the Findings of Fact and 
Amended Findings of Fact provided that "after July 1, 1996, the Plaintiff shall be 
able to provide for her own financial needs from the sale of the marital assets or a 
sale of a portion thereof awarded to her together with an alimony award in the 
amount of $1,000.00 per month to be increase to $1,950.00 per month upon the 
sale of the Birrell property/' (AR 213, 276) (emphasis added) 
The Conclusions of Law and Amended Conclusions of Law and the Decree 
of Divorce and Amended Decree of Divorce all provide in paragraph 14 
respectively, that all of the property and money received and retained by the parties 
under the settlement agreement should be the separate property of the respective 
parties free and clear of any right or interest or claim of the other party. (AR 188, 
251, 229-230, 280) The Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement has no 
similar provision. However, under both the Stipulation and Property Settlement 
Agreement and the Decree of Divorce, Mrs Lether was awarded the farm property 
and the Birrell property in Highland, Utah, including the home on the Birrell 
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property that was being rented for $950.00 per month. If paragraph 14 of the 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce is followed, Mrs Lether owns the 
Birrell rental home and should receive the rent. Therefore, her understanding that 
she was to receive the rent as part of her award of alimony until the home was sold, 
after which Mr. Lether would then pay $950.00 per month is plausible. The 
additional $950.00 a month alimony when the rent ceases, is a plausible under-
standing and interpretation of the terms of the Decree and Amended Decree of 
Divorce and of the Conclusions of Law. 
Moreover, the parole evidence proffered by Mrs Lether by way of affidavit 
strongly supports her interpretation. When she testified that she was receiving 
$2,000.00 per month alimony prior to the divorce as interim support and 
understood that she was to receive the same after the divorce. Mr. Lether 
acknowledged during the trial that he was paying her $2,000.00 interim alimony. 
Mr. Mitsunaga, Mrs Lether's attorney, in his affidavit, stated that his notes, which he 
took at the time of the settlement negotiations, along with the other evidence just 
recited, indicated to him that Mrs Lether was to receive $2,000.00 in alimony per 
month or the $1,000.00 per month from Mr. Lether and $950.00 per month from 
the rental property. 
As noted in the Statement of Relevant Facts, Mr. Lether informed the IRS that 
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he was not responsible for taxes on the $950.00 per month from the rental home, 
and that they should look for those from Mrs Lether. Perhaps more significant than 
all of this is that Mr. Lether never claimed to be entitled to the $950.00 per month 
rent for over 18 months after the Decree of Divorce, but allowed Mrs Lether to 
collect and use the rental money as part of her alimony. These surrounding 
circumstances seem to overwhelmingly indicate that the parties intended that Mrs 
Lether was entitled to the rent on the Birrell property as part of the alimony. 
The trial court, in reaching it's decision, viewed only the words and language 
of the sentence in paragraph 6 in the Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
that states that "the Defendant shall receive $950.00 per month from the Birrell 
rental home until the home is sold." The court held that there was no ambiguity in 
those words and that it was precluded from considering parole evidence to 
determine the intention of the parties quoting Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, 
Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, (Utah 1995). In doing so the court reasoned that the parties 
intended the stipulation and property settlement agreement to be a final and 
complete expression of their bargain, which they thereafter incorporated into the 
amended Decree. The judge concluded the Amended Decree then became part of 
an integrated agreement which was not ambiguous on It's face, and that it was 
inappropriate for the court to consider to parole evidence. 
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Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass'n and Taylor v. Hansen, Supra were 
decided after the Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc. case, and change the 
law in Utah with respect to whether the court could consider parole evidence to 
determine whether an agreement is ambiguous. In that respect, those two cases 
overrule the holding in Hall and earlier cases that parole evidence is not admissible 
to determine the intention of the parties, if the agreement is unambiguous on it's 
face. As a result, the court should have considered parole evidence in determining 
the intention of the parties and whether the integrated agreement, including the 
alimony provisions in the Decree of Divorce, were ambiguous. The court erred in 
not considering parole evidence in making that determination. It appears 
extremely likely that had the court considered parole evidence it would have 
reached a different conclusion about whether the terms of the various documents, 
which formed what the Court determined was one integrated agreement, were 
ambiguous. 
While the court should have considered parole evidence in making it's 
determination, the court nevertheless erred in concluding that the terms relating to 
the payment of alimony and the collection and application of the rents were not 
ambiguous on the face of the Amended Decree. Even under the cases cited by the 
court for support of it's decision, parole evidence is admissible to explain the 
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parties intent if documents taken together are ambiguous, because of the uncertain 
meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies. (Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, Supra 665 P.2d 1292-1293 (Utah 1983)) 
In view of the switching of the parties names or descriptions (Plaintiff and 
Defendant) in the last sentence of paragraph 6 of the Decree, it is irrational and 
inconsistent to conclude that under the surrounding circumstances Mr. Lether's was 
entitled to the rent. It is not logical that Mr. Lether should only have to pay $50.00 
out of pocket prior to the sale of the rental property and $1,950.00 per month once 
the rental home is sold and rent is no longer being collected by him. This together 
with the fact that the Birrell property and rental home was awarded to Mrs Lether in 
the Decree of Divorce, manifests uncertainty in the meaning of the terms and "other 
facial deficiencies/' Under these condition the court is permitted to consider 
parole evidence under Faulkner as well as other precedents cited by the court and 
in its ruling. 
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which the court of appeals 
views for correctness. No deference is given to the lower court's decision. (Taylor 
v. Hansen, Supra, 958 P.2d 923, 929) The alimony provisions of the Decree of 
Divorce, Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact and Stipulation and Property 
Settlement Agreement are on their face ambiguous. Further, summary judgment (or 
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dismissal) may not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity 
exists and there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended. (Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, Supra, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293) This court should overturn the trial 
court's decision and should remand the case back to the district court for further 
consideration of parole evidence to determine the intention of the parties and 
whether the judgment awarding Mr. Lether the rent should be vacated. 
B. Genuine Issues As To Material Facts Exist Regarding Mrs Lether's Claim For 
Alimony. 
Summary judgment may be granted only when there is no genuine issue of 
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
All facts together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are viewed 
in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure 56(c); Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association, supra, 907 P.2d 
264, 266; Bodell Construction, Co. V, Stewart Title Guaranty Company 945 P.2d 
119 (Utah App. 1997). Whether a party is entitled to summary judgment is a 
conclusion of law. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment no deference is 
accorded to the trial court. Id.; Faulkner v. Farnswoth, supra, 665 P.2d 1292, 1292. 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify the alimony award of a 
divorce decree. Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 (1953); Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 
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736, 739 (Utah App. 1992); Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah 
App. 1990). Before the court may modify the award the moving party must show 
there has been a substantial change of circumstances not contemplated since the 
decree of divorce. Id. 
Mrs Lether claimed in her petition to modify the decree of divorce that there 
has been a substantial change of circumstances in her health resulting in a 
substantial increase in her medical expenses. These circumstances prevented her 
from seeking employment to increase her income or to perform duties around the 
home and property which would help her reduce expenses. All occurred since the 
decree was entered. 
In ruling on a motion by Mr. Lether to dismiss the petition, the trial court 
below ruled that: 
Elizabeth's petition to modify may proceed at to the effect of her 
broken wrist, the steady decline in her health and the deterioration 
of her bones, but may not proceed on the basis of her back injury, 
the injury to her knee, the problem with her feet and her underactive 
thyroid except as these conditions have worsened since the decree. 
( emphasis added) (AR 614-613) 
In the judgment, the Court further defined the injury to her knee to be her right knee 
and stated Mrs Lether could, 
proceed on her petition to modify the alimony award as it may 
34 
be affected by her broken wrist, the steady decline in her health 
and the deterioration of her bones. (AR 622) (emphasis added) 
The form of the judgment entered was prepared by counsel for Mr. Lether. (AR 623) 
Mrs Lether provided an affidavit with financial records of medical expenses 
and averred as to her not being able to obtain employment because of her health. 
She averred that she experienced a substantial increase in her medical expenses 
and the expenses of maintaining the farm property pending sale. She provided one 
affidavit of a medical practitioner and a report and clinical notes from another that 
provided detailed information about their treatment and the deterioration of her 
health. Specifically, among other things, Mrs Lether provided or proffered by 
affidavit the following very relevant facts to show that there had been an 
unforeseeable and substantial change of circumstances since the decree of divorce: 
1) The factual allegations recited in her petition were true. 
(AR 592-591) 
2) At the time of the divorce she contemplated her health to get better, 
but it had gotten worse requiring her to have frequent medical treatment. 
(AR 443) 
3) She had been in a cast much of the time since the divorce and 
could not obtain work or do many of the chores around the property because 
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because health problems. (Id. & AR 591) 
4) In addition to the continued deterioration of her old health 
problems, she had been diagnosed to have a broken wrist which would need 
an operation that could result in her not being able to use her left hand in the 
future. (AR432) 
Mrs Lether attached a letter to one of her affidavits and clinical notes to 
another of her affidavits from Dr. Michael Callahan. Dr. Callahan's first 
examination of Mrs Lether was on August 24, 1994 over a month after the divorce. 
It is clear from that examination that Mrs Lether was having pain in her right knee 
and would need treatment. It is also to be reasonably inferred that she did not 
know at the time of the severity of the injury to her right knee and that it would 
need replacement. Prior to that time arthroscopic cleaning had been sufficient. 
While there is some indication of deterioration of her left knee, there is no 
indication at all that she would need a replacement of the left knee. (AR 880) 
Mrs Lether's right knee was replaced on May 17, 1995, about a year after the 
trial began, and, while her recovery was slow, the clinical notes indicate optimism 
about the recovery of the right knee. On 9-8-95 Dr. Callahan reports very 
optimistically on the recovery of the right knee. This is the first date that his notes 
give a hint of replacement of the left knee. (AR 882) However, the doctor notes 
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several problems that have developed, but indicates that while she wil l ultimately 
need the knee replaced he wants to treat it more conservatively without an 
operation as long as possible. 
It is clear from Dr. Callahan's clinical notes that there was no recognition of 
having to operate on her left knee at the time of the divorce. There is considerable 
question concerning the time at which it was foreseeable that she would have to 
have her right knee replaced and it appears that it was not until at least a month 
after the divorce. Many of Mrs. Lether's other physical problems do not appear to 
surface until nearly two years after the divorce. (AR 977-884) 
Dr. Callahan's gave his opinion in October 1995, over two years after the 
divorce that Mrs Lether would be incapable of working and supporting herself for 
the rest of her life. (AR 582) 
Dr. Thomas Rogers in his affidavit stated that after surgery on her right foot 
in 1992, her foot appeared to improve for a couple of years and appeared that it 
would not give her trouble in the future other than normal aging. However, that 
foot had deteriorated considerably in the last two years (1995 to 1997) and now her 
left foot was developing similar problems. He states she could not hold down a job 
that requires her to be on her feet or use any of her feet. 
Mrs Lether also provided sworn information about the apparent increased 
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affluence of Mr. Lether; that he had purchased another home in addition to the 
condominium he was awarded in the divorce. He had purchased a new and very 
expensive boat which was equipped for living and which he kept on Lake Mead. 
(AR 887) She averred that because of the problems which developed since the 
Decree she could not live in the manner to which she was accustomed to living 
prior to the divorce. 
After hearing of Mr. Lether's Motion For Summary Judgment and considering 
the memoranda of the parties, the trial judge dismissed Mrs Lether's petition in all 
respects including her claims for alimony. Based upon testimony at the trial, the 
judge concluded that there was no dispute as to any material fact as to whether Mrs 
Lether would be employable after the divorce. (AR 1206-1207) The Judge stated: 
There is no real issue as to Elizabeth's circumstances at the 
time of the divorce. True they may have worsened, but she was not 
employable at anything but minimum wage at the time of trial and 
clearly it was foreseeable then that she may not be employable even at 
minimum wage. The health difficulties which she now suffers largely 
result from the exacerbation of her existing health circumstances. These 
exacerbations were foreseeable. In short, I find no genuine issue as to the 
foreseeability of her present circumstances. 
In reaching his conclusion the trial judge could not have viewed the facts in 
a light most favorable to Mrs Lether. It may have been foreseeable at the time of 
trial that Mrs Lether's health would deteriorate. But there is evidence from both Mrs 
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Lether and her doctors that indicates the severe deterioration Mrs. Lether was not 
foreseeable at the time of the trial. 
The factual basis which the trial judge gives for his conclusion that she was 
not employable at the time of the divorce was Mrs Lether's own testimony at trial. 
At trial Mrs Lether expressed her doubts that she could work because she had 
developed no skills and because of her health. However, she indicated she might if 
she could. There was no expert medical testimony at trial that her health would not 
permit her to work or that her health, her bones, would deteriorate in the 
foreseeable future so that she could not work. In view of this fact and the medical 
testimony proffered from one to three years after the trial there is a genuine issue as 
to whether the deterioration of Mrs Lether's health was foreseeable at the time of 
trial and whether she could ever be employed. Indeed the factual finding at the 
time of the divorce was that she could be employed at a minimum wage. The trial 
judge erred in concluding there was no genuine issue of fact as to the issue of her 
health and employment. 
The trial judge overlooked entirely the issue of Mrs Lether's increased 
expenses from her worsened and new medical problems and of having to maintain 
the properties for over two years before any of the properties were sold. (AR 8862-
893) These also were substantial changes in her circumstances since the divorce. 
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agreement as to the distribution of the marital property. Specifically she states that, 
among other things, Mr. Lether represented the piano awarded to her was worth 
$10,500 and that he paid $10,250 for her jewelry. Mrs Lether learned after the trial 
and after the divorce that Mr. Lether paid only $4,500 for the piano when it was 
purchased over ten years earlier and that he had paid only $2,500 for her jewelry. 
(AR 588) 
Mr. Lether also misrepresented the amount of the mortgage payments on the 
Birrell and Farm properties stating that they were $1,630 and $1,600 when in fact 
they were only a little over $800. Mr. Lether only paid the actual amount of the 
payments after the divorce notwithstanding the Court had ordered him in the 
Decree to pay the $1,630 and $1,600 a month. ( AR 588-589, 572-580) The trial 
court granted Mrs Lether a judgment of $10,694.74 plus interest against Mr. Lether 
because he had not complied with the Decree. (AR 765) While this mis-
representation and Mr. Lether's conduct in not paying the amount ordered by the 
Decree do not go directly to the valuation of any of the property in the Property 
Settlement Agreement, it does go to Mr. Lether's lack of veracity and his not telling 
the truth in the property settlement negotiations. 
Mrs Lether also averred that Mr. Lether represented that there were three less 
water shares that went with the property than in fact there were. 
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These also raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
The trial judge concluded that the driving force behind Mrs Lether's petition 
was her unhappiness with her bargain in the settlement of the divorce. He reached 
this conclusion without taking any evidence. To the contrary there is much 
medical information that should be tested and clarified at an evidentiary heaing 
bdfore any such cconclusion is reached. 
The trial judge certainly did not view the medical evidence or information in 
a light most favorable to Mrs Lether. He did not view her statements that she might 
work if she could in a most favorable light to her. These are genuine and 
substantial issues that can only be resolved by an evidentiary hearing. 
No deference by the Court on appeal is given to the trial judge when 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment. When viewed in a light most favorable to 
Mrs Lether, as the law requires, there are genuine issues of material fact. The 
summary judgment as to her claims of alimony should be reversed and remanded. 
C. The Evidence Shows That Mr. Lether Grossly Overstated The Value Of Assets 
Awarded To Mrs Lether In The Divorce. The Case Should Be Remanded For 
Taking Of Evidence Of Fraud In The Valuation Of The Marital Property. 
Mrs Lether alleged in her Petition and set forth information in her affidavit 
that Mr. Lether had grossly overstated the values in connection with the settlement 
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The Court in dismissing Mrs Lether's claims of fraud from her petition, held 
that the parties intended the property settlement to be a final and complete 
expression and settlement of their marital affairs. (AR 615-616) The trial judge 
overlooked the fact that fraud in the inducement of a contract gives the other party 
the right to rescind the contract. While Mrs Lether did agree to accept the values 
attributed to the property in the settlement, she did so not knowing they were 
fraudulently stated by Mr. Lether. The court erred in refusing to allow evidence as 
to the fraud of Mr. Lether in the valuation of the property. The decision should be 
overturned and the case remanded for the taking of evidence on this issue. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Court did not properly apply the law of the controlling cases in Utah in 
determining that there was no ambiguity in the Decree's provisions relating to the 
payment of alimony and the entitlement to the rents from the Birrell rental property. 
The court further erred in determining that the Decree was not ambiguous on its 
face. 
The Court erred concluding that there was no genuine issue as to a 
substantial change of circumstances since the divorce as to Mrs Lether's health and 
her capability to be employed. The Court further erred in not considering the effect 
of the increased expenses of Mrs Lether's deteriorating health and new physical 
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problems since the Decree. 
Lastly, the trial court erred in declining to take evidence as to the alleged 
fraud of Mr. Lether in valuing the property at the time of the negotiations for 
settlement when there was evidence indicating fraud in specific instances. Fraud in 
the inducement of a contract allows the injured party the right of recission. 
The Court should overturn the decisions of the trial court in dismissing Mrs 
Lether's Petition For Clarification and/or Reformation or Modification of the Decree 
of Divorce and in awarding Mr. Lether judgment for the rents for over 18 months on 
the Birrell property. The Court should remand the case to the lower court for taking 
evidence on those issues. 
Respectfully submitted thisX<2 day of August, 1999. 
^*gflCfr 
Delano S. Findlay 
Oral Argument is requested. 
The addendum is bound separately and submitted herewith. 
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